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INTRODUCTION
During a floor debate in 1976, Representative Henry Hyde explained,
“I would certainly like to prevent, if I could legally, anybody having an
abortion, a rich woman, a middle class woman, or a poor woman.
Unfortunately, the only vehicle available is the [Medicaid] bill.”1 For a
short time after the Supreme Court of the United States established the
right to abortion in Roe v. Wade,2 Medicaid did not distinguish between
coverage for abortion and other medical services.3 That all changed when
Congress passed the Hyde Amendment to the Medicaid Act in 1976.4
Under the Medicaid Act,5 a state may choose to receive federal
funding to administer a Medicaid program.6 Although a state’s
participation in the program is completely voluntary, the state’s program
must comport with various federal requirements and meet with the
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1. CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, WHOSE CHOICE? HOW THE HYDE AMENDMENT HARMS POOR
WOMEN 14 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL)),
https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Hyde_Report_FINAL_
nospreads.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW8A-JPW6].
2. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973). Specifically, the Court held that state criminal
abortion laws that only provide exceptions for abortion procedures necessary to save the life of the
mother are unconstitutional because they violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which “protects against state action the right to privacy.” See id.
3. Marissa Spalding, How Hyde Hurts Women, CONSCIENCE (Dec. 3, 2015), http://
consciencemag.org/2015/12/03/how-hyde-hurts-women/ [https://perma.cc/L4W4-FG42].
4. Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a (2012)).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012).
6. Sandra Berenknopf, Comment, Judicial and Congressional Back-Door Methods That Limit
the Effect of Roe v. Wade: There is No Choice if There is No Access, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 653, 655–56
(1997).
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approval of the Secretary of Health and Human Services.7 Congress passed
the Hyde Amendment to limit Medicaid funding of abortions to only those
Congress deemed medically necessary—where the life of the mother
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term.8 In 1994, Congress
expanded the Hyde Amendment’s reach by also allocating funding for
abortions when the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest.9
For low-income women who rely on Medicaid—and for those who
lack the funds to pay an extra premium for an insurance plan that covers
abortion—the abortion right is no right at all if their state’s Medicaid
program does not fund abortion to the same degree it funds other general
health services. Unless these women have savings or another source of
money available, their inability to pay for an abortion precludes them from
accessing one. Thus, Hyde renders the abortion right meaningless for
women who cannot otherwise gather the funds required to exercise the
right.
This Note will argue that a right to abortion coverage for women who
lack the means to access the right can be accomplished not only through
the recognition of an intersectional suspect classification but also an
interpretation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA)10 as conferring positive rights. In Harris v. McRae, the Court
established the Hyde Amendment’s constitutional validity.11 In doing so,
the Court maintained that because Congress did not impinge on a
substantive right or purposefully detriment a suspect class through Hyde,
the rational relation standard applied.12 Recognizing a suspect
classification that accounts for the intersection of race, sex, and
socioeconomic status would be the first step towards triggering a strict
scrutiny analysis of Hyde due to the disproportionate impact Hyde has on
disadvantaged women of color. Additionally, understanding the PPACA
as conferring a positive right to health care could eventually favor a
finding of a positive right to abortion coverage, thus changing the Court’s
due process analysis in Harris.
The first section of this Note will introduce the Hyde Amendment,
the PPACA, and the role the PPACA has played in worsening Hyde’s
impact on low-income women.13 The second section will introduce the
7. Id. at 656.
8. Id. at 657.
9. Id. at 656–57.
10. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012)).
11. See generally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
12. Id. at 322–24.
13. See infra Part I.
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equal protection and due process problems presented in Harris and Maher
v. Roe,14 explain the importance of recognizing an intersectional suspect
classification in equal protection analysis, and explain how the PPACA
can be read as conferring a positive health care right.15 The third section
will explain how recognizing a positive health care right (and positive
constitutional rights, generally), though a drastic change from the Court’s
current reading of the Constitution and unlikely to take place at this time,
could change the due process analysis for Hyde and actually guarantee a
woman’s right to an abortion.16 The fourth section will address the fate of
Hyde, the PPACA, and abortion rights under the Trump administration.17
This Note will conclude by encouraging further research into two avenues
to find a better-protected abortion right—recognizing an intersectional
suspect classification and, pending the Trump administration’s further
treatment of the PPACA, reading the PPACA as conferring a positive
health care right.
I.

THE HYDE AMENDMENT AND THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PPACA)

The impact of the Hyde Amendment falls particularly hard on
women of color, who are disproportionately likely to be insured by the
Medicaid program; thirty percent of black women and twenty-four percent
of Hispanic women aged fifteen to forty-four are enrolled in Medicaid,
compared with fourteen percent of white women.18 To afford an abortion,
many low-income women lacking coverage forgo paying utility bills, rent,
or buying food for themselves and their children.19 Others rely on family
members for financial help, receive financial assistance from clinics, or
sell their personal belongings.20 In addition, in a 2009 literature review,
the Guttmacher Institute found that one-fourth of women who would have
Medicaid-funded abortions instead give birth when this funding is
unavailable.21 As Justice Marshall noted in his dissenting opinion in
14. See generally Harris, 448 U.S. at 297; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. Heather D. Boonstra, Abortion in the Lives of Women Struggling Financially: Why Insurance
Coverage Matters, 19 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 46, 49 (2016), https://www.
guttmacher.org/about/gpr/2016/07/abortion-lives-women-struggling-financially-why-insurancecoverage-matters [https://perma.cc/4DAG-DV6C].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See STANLEY K. HENSHAW ET. AL, GUTTMACHER INST., RESTRICTIONS ON MEDICAID
FUNDING FOR ABORTIONS: A LITERATURE REVIEW 1 (2009), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/
default/files/report_pdf/medicaidlitreview.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V2Z-RSKS].
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Harris, “[t]he Court’s opinion studiously avoids recognizing the
undeniable fact that for women eligible for Medicaid—poor women—
denial of a Medicaid-funded abortion is equivalent to denial of legal
abortion altogether.”22
The PPACA not only follows Hyde’s restrictions but also worsens
Hyde’s impact on low-income women and women of color. Both the
PPACA and an Executive Order issued by President Obama apply Hyde’s
funding restrictions to insurance policies offered on state insurance
exchanges.23 States or insurers offering plans in a state marketplace are not
required to offer abortion coverage, and the PPACA explicitly prohibits
states from including abortion in any essential benefits package.24 As a
result, women who receive subsidies from the federal government to help
them purchase private health insurance through state-based exchanges
have to pay two premiums for their insurance—one to pay for the cost of
the plan related to covering abortion, regardless of whether it is ever
utilized, and one to cover all the other costs of their health plan.25
The PPACA also stipulates that at least one multi-state plan must
limit abortion coverage to the coverage permitted by current federal law—
pregnancies that endanger the life of the woman or are the result of rape
or incest.26 While state Medicaid programs continue to have the option to
cover abortion in other circumstances using only state funds, states can
pass laws that bar all plans participating in the state marketplace from
covering abortions; at least twenty-five states have done so since the
PPACA was signed into law.27
At a minimum, states must cover those abortions that meet the
federal exceptions in the Hyde Amendment;28 they have the right to fund
more than federal law permits, but they may not fund less.29 Most state
22. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 338 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 18023(b)(1)(B) (2012); Exec. Order No. 13,535, § 1, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,599 (Mar.
29, 2010).
24. Alina Salganicoff et. al., Coverage for Abortion Services and the ACA, HENRY J. KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Abortion and the ACA], http://kff.org/womens-healthpolicy/issue-brief/coverage-for-abortion-services-and-the-aca/ [https://perma.cc/YWQ4-99N7].
25. JESSICA ARONS & MADINA AGÉNOR, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL:
THE HYDE AMENDMENT AND WOMEN OF COLOR 4 (Dec. 2010), https://www.americanprogress.org/
wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/12/pdf/hyde_amendment.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2A3-3KUE].
26. Abortion and the ACA, supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2016),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/state-funding-abortion-under-medicaid
[https://
perma.cc/4RZK-GLT9].
29. Access Denied: Origins of the Hyde Amendment and Other Restrictions on Public Funding
for Abortion, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/access-denied-origins-hydeamendment-and-other-restrictions-public-funding-abortion [https://perma.cc/EMF6-SJB7].
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legislatures have imposed restrictions on public funding for abortion and,
at present, only fifteen states fund abortions for low-income women on the
same or similar terms as other pregnancy-related and general health
services.30 Of these states, ten provide the funding under court orders.31 Of
women aged fifteen to forty-four enrolled in Medicaid, sixty percent live
in the thirty-five states and the District of Columbia that do not cover
abortion except in limited circumstances; this amounts to about seven
million women of reproductive age, including 3.4 million who are living
below the federal poverty level (FPL).32
Even though the number of women gaining access to health
insurance is rising under the PPACA, an increasing share of women are
facing limitations in the scope of that coverage when it comes to abortion
services.33 Coverage restrictions disproportionately affect poor and lowincome women with limited ability to pay for abortion services with outof-pocket funds.34 Women of color are disproportionately likely to be
insured by Medicaid,35 and over half of all women on Medicaid have
abortion coverage limited to pregnancies that endanger their lives or are a
result of rape or incest.36 As Professor Cynthia Soohoo notes, the Supreme
Court’s abortion funding cases allowed the federal government to use
Medicaid “to create, as a practical matter, a different set of rights for the
rich and the poor.”37 Rather than expanding coverage for medically
necessary abortions, “health care reform is likely to result in the largest
expansion of the Hyde restrictions since the amendment went into effect
in 1977.”38

30. Spalding, supra note 3.
31. Id.
32. Boonstra, supra note 18.
33. Alina Salganicoff et. al., Coverage for Abortion Services in Medicaid, Marketplace Plans
and Private Plans, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Abortion in Medicaid],
http://kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/coverage-for-abortion-services-in-medicaidmarketplace-plans-and-private-plans/ [https://perma.cc/Q67M-ZCWU].
34. Id.
35. Boonstra, supra note 18.
36. Abortion in Medicaid, supra note 33.
37. Cynthia Soohoo, Hyde-Care for All: The Expansion of Abortion-Funding Restrictions Under
Health Care Reform, 15 CUNY L. REV. 391, 441 (2012).
38. Id.
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FINDING A RIGHT TO ABORTION COVERAGE UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES
A. Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae

In two decisions within three years, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutional validity of (1) states limiting the use of their own Medicaid
benefits to medically necessary abortions,39 and (2) the Hyde
Amendment.40 The result is a negative abortion right with little utility for
women without health insurance or other resources to access that right.
In Maher, the Court determined indigent women seeking abortions
did not come within the limited category of disadvantaged classes
previously recognized by its cases.41 Two indigent women had attacked
the validity of a Connecticut regulation limiting state Medicaid benefits
for first trimester abortions to those that were “medically necessary.”42
While the district court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment forbid the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions
from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes the medical
expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth,43 the Court held that the
district court erred in its decision.44 The Court explained it had never held
that financial need alone identifies a suspect classification for purposes of
equal protection analysis.45
Additionally, the Court found that unlike the law in Roe, the
regulation did not interfere with a woman’s fundamental right to privacy
in making the decision to have an abortion because it placed no obstacles
in a pregnant woman’s path to accessing one.46 The Court wrote that “[t]he
indigency that may make it difficult and in some cases, perhaps,
impossible for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in any
way affected by the Connecticut regulation.”47 The Court also found that
“a State is not required to show a compelling interest for its policy choice
to favor normal childbirth any more than a State must so justify its election
to fund public but not private education.”48 As a result, the Court
determined the Connecticut regulation at issue was rationally related to a
39. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 464–65 (1977).
40. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 298–99 (1980).
41. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 470–71.
42. Id. at 466–67.
43. Id. at 468.
44. Id. at 470.
45. Id. at 471.
46. Id. at 472–74.
47. Id. at 475.
48. Id. at 477.
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constitutionally permissible purpose—a state’s strong and legitimate
interest in encouraging normal childbirth—and was therefore
constitutionally valid.49
Moreover, the Court in Harris declared it “does not follow that a
woman’s freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to
the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected
choices.”50 The Court directly addressed the question of whether the Hyde
Amendment, by denying public funding for certain medically necessary
abortions, contravenes the liberty or equal protection guarantees of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.51 The plaintiffs included four
Medicaid recipients who wished to have medically necessary abortions but
did not qualify for federal funds under the versions of Hyde in 1977 and
1978.52 The district court found that when an abortion is medically
necessary to safeguard the pregnant woman’s health, the disentitlement to
Medicaid assistance impinges directly on the woman’s right to decide, in
consultation with her physician, whether to terminate her pregnancy.53
Thus, the district court held that Hyde violated the Fifth Amendment’s
equal protection guarantee because Congress’s decision to fund medically
necessary services generally, but only certain medically necessary
abortions, served no legitimate governmental interest.54 However, the
Court did not agree. It explained that although the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government
interference with freedom of choice in personal decisions, it does not
confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the
advantages of that freedom.55
After determining Hyde violated no constitutionally protected
substantive rights, the Court followed its determination in Maher that
poverty is not a suspect class and that the limitation of federal Medicaid
funds to certain medically necessary abortions is rationally related to the
legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life.56 The Court
declared that Hyde, like the regulation in Maher, places no governmental
obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy.57
Rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical
49. See id. at 478 (citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977)).
50. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
51. Id. at 301.
52. Id. at 304.
53. Id. at 305–06 (citing McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)).
54. Id. at 306.
55. Id. at 316–17.
56. Id. at 323–24.
57. Id. at 315.
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services, Hyde “encourages alternate activity deemed in the public
interest.”58 The Court further stated “[t]he financial constraints that restrict
an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally
protected freedom of choice are the product not of governmental
restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency.”59
Accordingly, it determined Congress must answer whether freedom of
constitutionally protected choice warrants federal subsidization and held
that Hyde does not impinge on the due process liberty recognized in Roe.60
B.

An Intersectional Suspect Classification

Poor and low-income women of color are represented
disproportionately among Medicaid recipients;61 consequently, Hyde
affects large numbers of women who live at the intersection of various
lines of subordination, including race, gender, and class.62 Professor
Kimberlé Crenshaw argues for judicial recognition of the way sex and race
discrimination intersect to operate against black women in a unique way.63
She points out that black women often experience double discrimination—
the combined effects of practices which discriminate on the basis of race
and on the basis of sex.64 She further declares that courts and feminist and
civil rights thinkers have treated black women “in ways that deny both the
unique compoundedness of their situation and the centrality of their
experiences to the larger classes of women and Blacks.”65 For example,
someone can experience discrimination as a person of color, a woman, and
a low-income individual simultaneously.66 Madeline Gomez similarly
argues that since Roe, an over-zealous, under-inclusive focus on the “right
to choose” within abortion litigation has helped to facilitate the
development of legal doctrine that fails to consider the intersectional

58. Id.
59. Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 318.
61. Boonstra, supra note 18.
62. Jill E. Adams & Jessica Arons, A Travesty of Justice: Revisiting Harris v. McRae, 21 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 5, 50–51 (2016).
63. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 149–50 (1989), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1052&context=uclf [https://perma.cc/GLJ4-9556].
64. Id. at 149.
65. Id. at 150.
66. Hailey K. Flynn, Note, A Postal Code Lottery: Unequal Access to Abortion Services in the
United States and Northern Ireland, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 629, 681 (2016).
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subordination experienced by Latina immigrant women and other
marginalized women, especially those of color.67
Rather than recognizing that women of color are a suspect
classification due to the intersectionality of their characteristics and
subsequent experiences, “Supreme Court jurisprudence has insisted on
evaluating the discriminatory purpose and effect of a statute based on a
single identity or condition . . . .”68 The Court then “tends to apply an
analysis commensurate with that which falls the lowest in its hierarchy of
suspect classifications.”69 By doing so, the Court ignores violations of
equal protection “that are based on a group’s multiple, intersecting
characteristics.”70 In Maher, and again in Harris, the Court did exactly that
by determining the failure to provide Medicaid funds for both
nontherapeutic abortions and some medically necessary abortions did not
discriminate against a suspect classification:
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come
within the limited category of disadvantaged classes so
recognized by our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of
the regulation falls upon those who cannot pay lead to a
different conclusion. In a sense, every denial of welfare to
an indigent creates a wealth classification as compared to
nonindigents who are able to pay for the desired goods or
services. But this Court has never held that financial need
alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis.71

In Maher and Harris, the Court ignored the race and sex of the
population most impacted by the Hyde restrictions, characteristics that
would trigger heightened scrutiny in equal protection analysis. Justice
Marshall pointed out this lack of recognition in his dissenting opinion in
Harris:
The class burdened by the Hyde Amendment consists of
indigent women, a substantial proportion of whom are
members of minority races. As I observed in Maher,
nonwhite women obtain abortions at nearly double the rate
of whites . . . . In my view, the fact that the burden of the
67. Madeline M. Gomez, Note, Intersections at the Border: Immigration Enforcement,
Reproductive Oppression, and the Policing of Latina Bodies in the Rio Grande Valley, 30 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 84, 112–13 (2015).
68. Adams & Arons, supra note 62, at 52 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470–71 (1977) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)).
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Hyde Amendment falls exclusively on financially destitute
women suggests a “special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”72

The Court should account for the intersectionality of factors like race,
sex, and socioeconomic status when determining whether a law
disproportionately impacts a certain minority group to the extent that strict
scrutiny analysis is triggered. The implementation of the PPACA has
worsened the effects of Hyde on women who experience discrimination
on multiple fronts.73 A majority of state Medicaid programs fail to cover
nontherapeutic abortions, and at least twenty-five states have barred all
plans participating in the state’s marketplace from covering abortions.74
However, “when a law disproportionately affects women of color—and
poor women at that—the Court ignores the disparate racial impact of the
law, ‘downgrades’ the standard of review applicable because it discounts
the invidiousness of sex-based classifications, and then applies rational
review based on their indigent status alone.”75 As a result, the abortion
right—a negative right—is meaningless to women without the adequate
resources to exercise it.
Although the PPACA has worsened the impact of Hyde’s restrictions
on low-income, minority women living in states that fail to provide
Medicaid coverage for nontherapeutic abortions, the Act carries a silver
lining: its potential reading as a declaration of positive rights. The
PPACA’s seeming declaration of a positive health care right could call
into question the Court’s argument in Harris that the right to an abortion
is not a positive one.76
C. The PPACA and Positive Rights
The Hyde Amendment’s constitutionality rests upon an
understanding of the right to an abortion as a negative right. The Court in
Harris determined that the federal government’s failure to subsidize
certain medically necessary abortions was not a violation of the due
process liberty recognized in Roe because recognizing a privacy right to
abortion does not confer an entitlement to the funds necessary to access
72. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 343–44 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing United States
v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)).
73. See supra Part I.
74. See Boonstra, supra note 18; Abortion and the ACA, supra note 24.
75. Adams & Arons, supra note 62, at 53.
76. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 317.
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one.77 It further reasoned that “[t]o translate the limitation on
governmental power implicit in the Due Process Clause into an affirmative
funding obligation would require Congress to subsidize the medically
necessary abortion of an indigent woman even if Congress had not enacted
a Medicaid program to subsidize other medically necessary services.”78
Thus, the Court seemed to indicate that only a direct interference with a
fundamental right would constitute an infringement.79
The Court’s due process analysis in Harris is in line with our
constitutional system’s treatment of rights as “individual, alienable, and
negative.”80 Constitutional rights are usually understood to impose on
government “only a duty to refrain from certain injurious actions, rather
than an affirmative obligation to direct energy or resources to meet
another’s needs.”81
Negative rights “forbid the state from taking action of some kind”;82
for example, Roe forbids any state interference with a woman’s choice to
have an abortion during the first trimester of her pregnancy.83 On the other
hand, positive rights are generally defined as legally enforceable claims to
food, shelter, health care, education, and sometimes employment.84 These
rights are called “positive” “because they require the state to take
initiatives” and, more importantly, “appropriate funds.”85 Recognition of
positive health care rights would thus call into question the understanding
of abortion as a negative right.
A negative right to abortion is no right at all for low-income women
without appropriate health insurance or other means to cover the cost.
Women in this situation can only access this “right” if it is treated as
positive—if the state takes the initiative to appropriate funds for its
77. Id. at 316–18.
78. Id. at 318.
79. See Larry P. Boyd, The Hyde Amendment: New Implications for Equal Protection Claims,
33 BAYLOR L. REV. 295, 299 (1981).
80. Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative
Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 330 (1985) (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. Edward Rubin, The Affordable Care Act, the Constitutional Meaning of Statutes, and the
Emerging Doctrine of Positive Constitutional Rights, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1639, 1687 (2012);
see also Helen Hershkoff, Foreword, Positive Rights and the Evolution of State Constitutions, 33
RUTGERS L.J. 799, 809 (2002) (“Negative rights comprise defensive claims against invasion by the
state; the citizen can assert a negative right against the government, which then may be barred from
invading aspects of the individual’s liberty or property.”).
83. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
84. Rubin, supra note 82, at 1686; see also Hershkoff, supra note 82, at 809 (“If negative rights
provide a shield, positive rights extend a sword, entailing affirmative claims that can be used to compel
the state to afford substantive goods or services as an aspect of constitutional duty.”).
85. Rubin, supra note 82, at 1686–87.
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fulfillment. Professor Aditi Gowri critiques the dichotomy of negative and
positive rights, arguing that prioritizing negative rights—or “leave me
alone rights”—is “effectively to have decided that it is more important to
expend public resources on increasing the range of choices available to
those who already have more power, money, and knowledge than to
increase opportunities for those who have less resources.”86 She argues
that the dichotomy between both types of rights is politically suspect
because granting only negative rights “augments the freedom of those with
greater power, money, and other resources, while constraining those with
less.”87 With regard to reproductive rights, she adds that “those constrained
by a negative right will more often be women than men.”88 This concern
has rung true in the realm of abortions rights; women with the appropriate
means are able to choose whether or not to exercise their abortion right,
while those lacking such means effectively have no choice.
Although constitutional rights are commonly understood as negative,
there are some exceptional rights within the Constitution that could be
given an affirmative reading and bestow “at least contingent affirmative
burdens on government—for example, the Fourteenth Amendment right
that no state ‘deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.’”89 Additionally, “there is growing international recognition
that respect for civil and political rights may require affirmative
government action.”90 A number of nations have codified positive rights
into their own constitutions, and these rights are also on display in the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.91 Although the
Court in 1989 explicitly declared it would not recognize positive rights,92
Professor Edward Rubin critically points out that another institution also
interprets the Constitution—the Legislature.93
Professor Rubin suggests that if we want to know the current state of
constitutional thinking about positive rights, we need to look to statutes as
86. Aditi Gowri, Reproduction, Rights and Public Policy: A Framework for Assessment, 35 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 13, 20 (2000) (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 14.
88. Id.
89. Tribe, supra note 80, at 332.
90. Soohoo, supra note 37, at 428.
91. Rubin, supra note 82, at 1685–86. See generally G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
92. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1989)
(holding that although the Due Process Clause forbids a state itself from depriving individuals of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an
affirmative obligation on a state to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other
means).
93. Rubin, supra note 82, at 1694.
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well as decided cases: “[S]tatutes affect judicial interpretation of the
Constitution because the statutes themselves are interpretations.”94 He
argues that “statutory law is moving toward the implementation of positive
rights . . . toward the idea that every American has a right to food, shelter,
health care, and education”—and the PPACA is a “dramatic acceleration”
of this trend.95
According to Professor Rubin, the PPACA’s universality,
uniformity, and strong normativity all point to its possession of the
characteristics of a positive constitutional right to health care.96 Rather
than applying only to a particular segment of the population, the Act
applies to nearly everyone and appears to avoid the stigma of a welfare
program.97 The Act is also uniform in putting wage earners and the poor
in the same boat; instead of a program directed only at wage earners (like
Social Security), or only the poor (like food stamps), the PPACA combines
both groups and is perceived as minimizing the difference between them.98
Lastly, the PPACA has been presented not merely as a social program but
as a moral imperative.99
Professor Rubin offers the right of free speech as an example of a
constitutional right that shares the same three features of universality,
uniformity, and normativity that the PPACA possesses: The right applies
to everyone, operates for everyone in the same essential way, and is
regarded as a moral imperative.100 As a result, he concludes the PPACA
simultaneously challenges the courts to think about establishing positive
rights as a matter of constitutional law and facilitates any effort by the
courts to do so. “It encourages judges to reverse DeShaney and hold [that]
the Due Process Clause guarantees minimal levels of safety and
security.”101
III.

A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO ABORTION COVERAGE

Even if the PPACA was interpreted as conferring a positive health
care right on Americans, the Executive Order applying Hyde’s restrictions
to the PPACA102 warrants further analysis in finding a positive right to
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1701–02.
96. Id. at 1704.
97. Id. at 1702.
98. Id. at 1703.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1704.
101. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 18023(b)(1)(B) (2012); Exec. Order No. 13,535, § 1, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,599 (Mar.
29, 2010).
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abortion through this interpretation. Although reclaiming the abortion
right as a health care right instead of a “choice” “has the potential to offer
greater protection for access to abortion-related healthcare[,]”103 applying
the PPACA’s recognition of positive constitutional rights to the Court’s
due process analysis in Harris is another way to accomplish this result.
Any reversal of the principle in DeShaney, where the Court explicitly
held the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative obligation on
a state,104 would call into question the Court’s due process analysis
regarding the federal government’s obligations in Harris. Professor Rubin
indicated a positive-rights reading of the PPACA could encourage judges
to reverse DeShaney,105 and the Court’s due process analysis in Harris
rests upon his finding that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause
imposes no affirmative obligation on the government.106 The Court in
Harris affirmed that the liberty protected by the Clause affords protection
against unwarranted government interference.107 A transition toward
understanding our constitutional rights as positive would thus expand the
federal government’s role. Contrary to the Court’s reasoning, a woman’s
freedom of choice would “carr[y] with it a constitutional entitlement to the
financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices”108
under this new understanding of the liberty protected under the Clause.
Rather than blaming a woman’s indigency for her inability to enjoy the
full range of her constitutionally protected freedom of choice,109 a positive
understanding of our rights would require the federal government to
remove the restrictions placed on her by the Hyde Amendment.
Accordingly, the government, not the woman, would bear the
responsibility for her inability to enjoy the full range of her freedom of
choice.
The PPACA’s seeming grant of a positive health care right is a
vehicle for finding Hyde unconstitutional. Although the recognition of
positive constitutional rights would represent a major and highly
controversial development for American constitutional law,110 and the
current makeup of the Court “seems to prefer retrenchments and

103. Yvonne Lindgren, Note, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion
Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 421 (2013).
104. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
105. Rubin, supra note 82, at 1704.
106. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980).
107. Id. at 317.
108. Id. at 316.
109. Id.
110. Rubin, supra note 82, at 1686.
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clarifications to major innovations,”111 the PPACA presents a unique
challenge to the Court to consider positive rights as a part of constitutional
law.112 A movement toward positive rights, with the PPACA as the
vehicle, would present an opportunity for the Court to not only reconsider
its DeShaney holding113 but also revisit its due process analysis in cases
like Harris. Reversing the DeShaney holding and revisiting Harris would
force the Court to grapple with its affirmation that freedom of choice does
not carry a constitutional entitlement to the resources necessary to exercise
that freedom,114 thus opening the door to finding Hyde unconstitutional.
IV.

THE FATE OF HYDE AND THE PPACA UNDER THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION

The search for a right to abortion coverage—a right that is
meaningful for low-income, minority women that lack adequate health
insurance or other means to cover the cost—appears fruitless under the
current administration. President Trump has suggested he will preserve
Planned Parenthood’s federal funding only if the organization
discontinues providing abortion services;115 has signed a bill rolling back
an Obama administration rule barring states from denying family planning
grants to Planned Parenthood and other abortion providers;116 has vowed
to nominate anti-choice justices to the Supreme Court;117 and nominated
Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Court, who “voted with a majority of the
111. Id. at 1693.
112. See id. at 1704.
113. Id.
114. The Court in Harris held that (1) the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause “affords
protection against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice” in personal
decisions, but “does not confer an entitlement” to the funds necessary to exercise that freedom, and
(2) poverty is not a suspect classification, and the limitation of federal Medicaid funds to certain
medically necessary abortions is “rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of
protecting potential life.” Harris, 448 U.S. at 317–18, 323–24.
115. Maggie Haberman, Trump Tells Planned Parenthood Its Funding Can Stay if Abortion
Goes, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/us/politics/plannedparenthood.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4FQJ-F734]. Of course, the Hyde Amendment already bars
the use of federal funds to pay for abortions that are not medically necessary or not the result of rape
or incest. Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a (2012)).
116. Juliet Eilperin, Behind Closed Doors, Trump Signs Bill Allowing States to Strip Federal
Family Planning Funds From Abortion Providers, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2017, 2:43 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/04/13/behind-closed-doors-trump-signsbill-allowing-states-to-strip-federal-family-planning-dollars-from-abortion-providers/?utm_term=
.9b315d067c33 [https://perma.cc/82GD-RHAV].
117. Letter from Donald J. Trump, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., to Pro-Life Leader (Sept.
2016), https://www.sba-list.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Trump-Letter-on-ProLife-Coalition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R8XR-DTRV].
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[Tenth Circuit] in favor of privately held for-profit secular
corporations . . . who raised religious objections to paying for
contraception for women covered under their health care plans.”118
Additionally, on January 24, 2017, the House passed the No Taxpayer
Funding for Abortion and Abortion Insurance Full Disclosure Act.119 If the
Act passes the Senate, the Hyde Amendment, which has always functioned
as a budget rider attached to individual federal appropriations bills, would
become a permanent rule.120 Thus, the Internal Revenue Code and the
PPACA would be amended to prohibit qualified health plans from
including coverage for abortions.121 This potential codification of Hyde
and complete bar of abortion coverage in health plans under the PPACA
would render the negative abortion right even more inaccessible for lowincome women.
While the Trump Administration and Congress’s anti-choice stance
does not bode well for low-income women seeking meaningful access to
abortion—and the confirmation of Justice Gorsuch yields no shift in a
Court already unlikely to recognize positive rights—the PPACA will
likely remain in place. In July 2017, the Senate rejected a Republican plan
to repeal the PPACA requirements that most people have health coverage
and that large employers offer coverage to their workers.122 According to
the CBO, the plan would have increased the number of uninsured people
to 15 million by next year, and would have increased premiums by around
twenty percent for people buying insurance on their own.123 More recently,
Majority Leader McConnell called off a vote on a PPACA-repeal bill after
Senate Republicans could not garner the votes to meet the fifty-one-vote
threshold required for passage.124 The bill was a last-ditch effort to repeal
118. Hobby Lobby Case Among Supreme Court Nominee Neil Gorsuch’s Notable Opinions, CHI.
TRIBUNE (Jan. 31, 2017, 7:57 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/
ct-supreme-court-nominee-neil-gorsuch-notable-opinions-20170131-story.html
[http://perma.cc/
A66A-VQ7N].
119. H.R. 7, 115th Cong. (as passed by House, Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/
115th-congress/house-bill/7/text/eh [https://perma.cc/U67N-J2RW].
120. H.R. 7, 115th Cong. § 101 (2017).
121. H.R. 7, 115th Cong. § 201 (2017). “Currently, qualified health plans may cover abortion,
but the portion of the premium attributable to abortion coverage is not eligible for subsidies.” All Bill
Information (Except Text) for H.R.7 - No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion and Abortion Insurance Full
Disclosure Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/housebill/7/all-info [https://perma.cc/A2U2-8MFX].
122. Robert Pear & Thomas Kaplan, Senate Rejects Slimmed-Down Obamacare Repeal as
McCain Votes No, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/us/politics/
obamacare-partial-repeal-senate-republicans-revolt.html?mcubz=0.
123. Id.
124. See Lauren Fox et al., Senate Won’t Vote on GOP Health Care Bill, CNN (Sept. 26,
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/26/politics/health-care-republican-senate-vote/index.html
[http://perma.cc/8VVK-4VEL].

2018]

Finding a Right to Abortion Coverage

671

the PPACA before the budget rules expired and sixty votes are required to
overcome a Democrat (or Republican) filibuster of a bill.125
Despite the Trump administration’s demonstrated hostility toward
abortion rights and the PPACA, Congress’s failure to repeal it allows for
a potential positive rights understanding of the Act to persist. The
possibility does exist that the Trump administration may stop defending
the PPACA’s cost-sharing reductions (CSRs) in court,126 which “would
cause health insurers to hike premiums or leave the Obamacare market
altogether.”127 The federal government pays CSRs to health insurers to
lower cost sharing (i.e., deductibles and copays) for the poorest
Obamacare enrollees, paying out $7 billion through this program last
year.128 House Republicans filed a lawsuit in July 2014, arguing that
because Congress did not actually appropriate the money for these funds,
the administration should not continue making these payments.129 A
federal judge agreed with the House members and ordered a halt to the
payments, but suspended the order to allow the government to appeal.130
The case is currently pending before the Federal Circuit.131 While the
Trump administration has not committed to paying the PPACA’s CSRs in
2018, it has been paying the subsidies on a month-to-month basis since
President Trump assumed office.132
Lastly, barring any major shifts on the bench during the
administration’s tenure, abortion jurisprudence is unlikely to change. As a
125. See Lisa Mascan, Why Republicans Are Racing to Pass Healthcare by Sept. 30 and
What’s Next for Obamacare Repeal, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/
la-na-pol-healthcare-deadline-qa-20170925-story.html [http://perma.cc/D5LU-SXVP]. However,
Senate Republicans have vowed to take another crack at repealing the PPACA through the 2019
budget reconciliation process, which would only require fifty votes for passage (assuming Vice
President Pence casts the tiebreaking vote). See Fox et al., supra note 124.
126. Sarah Kliff, Insurance Regulators Are Panicked About Obamacare’s Future, VOX (Apr.
10, 2017, 2:50 PM), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/4/10/15247724/obamacare-futuremarketplaces [https://perma.cc/CP2E-J55Q].
127. Trump Threatens to Cut Obamacare Payments, BBC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2017), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39591989 [https://perma.cc/CS8P-D5RD]. Unfortunately, the
Trump administration’s refusal to commit to paying the PPACA’s CSRs is already causing insurers to
hike the cost of premiums in several states. See Jayne O’Donnell, Obamacare Rates Soar as White
House Refuses to Make Long Term Commitment to Subsidies, USA TODAY (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/09/27/obamacare-rates-soar-uncertawhitehouse-but-hill-action-makes-insurers-more-likely-keep-selling-plan/705838001/
[http://perma.cc/B9LM-9W76].
128. Kliff, supra note 126.
129. Id.
130. Robert Pear & Thomas Kaplan, Trump Threat to Obamacare Would Send Premiums and
Deficits Higher, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/cboobamacare-cost-sharing-reduction-trump.html [https://perma.cc/4NZ2-H7RX].
131. Id.
132. Id.
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result, repealing Hyde still remains the next hurdle in achieving a right to
abortion for all women, not just those with the means to access that right.
The PPACA’s likely permanence under the Trump administration thus
allows for a positive-rights understanding of the Act to persist.
CONCLUSION
Hyde’s 1976 passage severely curtailed the abortion right,
preventing a woman who receives Medicaid benefits from using those
benefits to pay for an abortion. Hyde’s burden, which functionally denies
the abortion right to Medicaid recipients who cannot pay out-of-pocket for
the procedure, disproportionately falls on poor and low-income women of
color, who are most likely to receive Medicaid benefits.133 The PPACA’s
2010 passage worsened Hyde’s impact on these women, strengthening the
equal protection arguments against Hyde’s constitutional validity; the Act
continues to disproportionately impact a group based on the
intersectionality of sex, race, and socioeconomic status.134
While the Act’s effects have strengthened the argument for the
recognition of an intersectional suspect classification,135 the PPACA’s
features also seemingly confer a positive health care right on the American
people.136 In doing so, the Act opens the door to finding other kinds of
positive rights—rights that require the government to take the initiative to
appropriate funds for their fulfillment.137 Further research on the
constitutionality of Hyde should explore potential means for recognizing
both an intersectional suspect classification and positive rights. While the
Court’s eventual recognition of an intersectional suspect classification
may be more likely than its recognition of positive constitutional rights,
more scholarship on using the PPACA to recognize positive rights could
eventually pave the way for an abortion right that is meaningful and
protected for all women. The PPACA creates an avenue for the Court to
find a positive abortion right that not only protects a woman from state
interference in exercising her right but also ensures she has the resources
necessary to access this due process liberty.

133. See supra Part I.
134. Id.
135. See supra Part II(B).
136. See supra Part II(C).
137. See supra Part III.

